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In the Wake of Reed v. The S.S. Yaka
By CAti, 0.

BUE, JR.*

Introduction
THE Supreme Court decision of Reed v. The S.S. Yakal has been
described as one of the most vivid examples of "judicial legislation"
to emanate from the Court m recent years. In an opinion in which
seven justices supported the majority view, it was held that the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Acte were subordinated to the warranty of
seaworthiness and that a longshoreman-employee could sue his employer when a shipowner pro hac vice for unlimited damages after
obtaining compensation and medical benefits under the act. Only
Mr. Justice Harlan joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, observed
that Yaka exceeds the outer limits beyond which judicial construction
of the language of a statute should go. The significance of the prophecy nplicit in Mr. Justice Harlan's observations has become increasingly apparent, as the shadow of this monumental decision has
lengthened and its impact has been more fully recognized.
With full appreciation that the interpretive process is far from
over and that the passage of time during which this Supreme Court
decision will be subjected to further judicial interpretation will not
necessarily resolve the fundamental issues involved, it is appropriate
to revisit Reed v. The S.S. Yaka and to examine what has transpired
since this landmark case appeared in May, 1963.3 During this period
of more than three years a number of district court cases and at least
three circuit court opinions as of this writing have made their appearance. To suggest that they reflect unanimity and a complete understanding of what the Supreme Court meant would be presumptive
and maccurate, since they do not. However, such opimons can be
appropriately characterized as the pronouncements of well meaning
courts that, faced with a legal dilemma of Gordian knot proportions,
have struggled as best they could to apply the law as enunciated by
the Court in Yaka.

No analysis of the cases interpreting Yaka can acquire significant
0 Member, Houston Bar and Maritime Law Association of the United States.
3373 U.S. 410,1963 A.M.C. 1373 (1963).
244 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
8 Rehearing was denied in October, 1963.
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meaning without an intelligent appreciation of the background of the
case itself. This is true because the parties to the lawsuit could scarcely
have foreseen the result which the Supreme Court ultimately reached
in this case. As the dissenting opinion points out, counsel for Reed
did not urge the theories which the majority of the Court eventually
decided to rely upon to support its position. Much earlier in the litigation, Reed's counsel had actually sued the vessel owner in personam,
but this theory had been abandoned and the action dismissed. 4 Without belaboring the details of the litigation leading to the Supreme
Court's holding, it is important nevertheless, that the problem be
visualized in its full factual context. Only then can the subsequent
lower court opinions be examined to discern, not only how Yaka has
been interpreted to date, but also where its rationale can conceivably
lead in the future.
The Background of Reed v. The S.S. Yaka
The Facts of the Accident and the Course
of the Ensuing Litigation
The case was precipitated by an accident which occurred to a
longshoreman, Elijah Reed, while he was working as a member of a
longshore gang on board the S.S. Yaka moored at Pier A, Port Richmond, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on March 23, 1956. A cargo of
chocolate syrup in cans was being lowered on pallets into one of the
'tween decks of the ship through the use of the ship's winches where
Reed and three other members of the gang were stowing the cargo.
A staging of unused pallets had been fashioned into a landing platform
in order to facilitate the proper placement of the remainder of the
stow In some manner Reed's right foot went through one of the
facing boards of the top pallet, as he was assisting the others in
maneuvering the mcoming load onto the staging. With his foot entrapped, Reed cried out in pain. The winchman, hearing the cry and
assuming that it was the signal to lower the pallet onto the staging,
did so in accordance with the usual practice. As a result of the loaded
pallet landing on Reed and knocking him down, he sustained injuries
to his right foot. The pallet in question was later examined, and it was
determined that a latent defect in one of the boards was the sole
proximate cause of the accident.
Waterman Steamship Corporation was the owner of the S.S. Yaka,
but shortly before Reed's accident it had been delivered to Pan4373 U.S. at 411 n.1, 1963 A.M.C. at 1375 n.1.
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Atlantic Steamship Corporation which was to operate the vessel under
the terms of a written bareboat charter. The charter agreement
provided that Pan-Atlantic would indemnify and hold harmless
Waterman against liens of any nature and against any claims resultng from the operation of the vessel by Pan-Atlantic including any
act or neglect on its part in connection with such operation. PanAtlantic was also engaged in stevedore operations which included the
employing of longshoreman Reed and the furishing of the necessary
pallets to conduct loading operations.
As a result of the accident to longshoreman Reed, a libel in rem,
an action in admiralty solely against the sip, was filed against the
S.S. Yaka alleging that the unseaworthmess of the vessel was the prommate cause of the injures sustained. The owner of the S.S. Yaka,
Waterman Steamship Corporation, answered the libel and ffied the
usual claim of ownership. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, the
bareboat charterer, was npleaded by Waterman, it being alleged
that Pan-Atlantic was obligated to indemnify the ship and its owner
under the terms of the charter for any loss suffered as a result of the
principal claim. The trial court determined that the defect in the
pallet on which Reed was standing rendered the S.S. Yaka unseaworthy It further held the S.S. Yaka liable in rem and the impleaded
respondent, Pan-Atlantic, liable over to Waterman under the written
indemnity provisions of the bareboat charter, despite the fact that
Pan-Atlantic was also longshoreman Reed's employer and presumably
insulated by the exclusiveness of liability provisions contained in the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.5 Both
Waterman and Pan-Atlantic appealed.6
7
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court.
In doing so, the court held that the S.S. Yaka which had been demised
by its owner, Waterman, to Pan-Atlantic, could not be subjected to a
libel for personal injuries in the absence of personal liability of one
possessing an interest in the vessel. The Longshoremen's Act was held to
be the sole remedy open to Reed for recovery for personal injuries
under the circumstances. Since the existing unseaworthmess at the
time of the accident resulted solely from the conduct of the charterer's
employees in bringing a defective pallet on board the S.S. Yaka, the
court concluded that there was no liability as to Waterman. Inasmuch
as Pan-Atlantic, the bareboat charterer, was also Reed's employer,
5 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
6 Reed v. The Yaka, 183 F Supp. 69 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
7Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 307 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1962).
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Pan-Atlantic was given the benefit of the immunity from any action
for unseaworthmess because of the provisions of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act pertaining to the exclusiveness of liability
of the employer. A motion for rehearing was denied per curiam with
two judges dissenting." One was of the opinion that the decision
removed from the longshoreman the right to the protective warranty
of seaworthiness; the other was of the opinion that liability would be
demed only in instances in which the employer was also the shipowner
as opposed to the bareboat charterer.
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was applied for
by counsel for Reed. Ostensibly it was granted by the Court so that
the question of whether personal liability is essential to the affixing
of liability against a vessel as an entity could be resolved. However,
whereas the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had rested its
opinion on the impropriety of a libel in rem against the vessel itself,
the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a ship
might be held liable for its unseaworthmess where no personal liability could be asserted. It simply concluded that the court of appeals
was in error in holding that Pan-Atlantic could not be held personally
liable for the unseaworthmess of the vessel which had caused Reeds
injuries, and that the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act relating
to the exclusiveness of liability of the employer did not prevent a
recovery by Reed under the circumstances. 9 Mr. Justice Black wrote
the majority opinion and was joined by six other members of the Court.
Mr. Justice Harlan was joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, and the former
wrote a strong dissent, observing that the decision went further than
anything yet done by the Court in FELA and admiralty cases and that
the impact of the opinion was to effectively repeal a basic aspect of the
Longshoremen's Act.10
The Legal Issues and the Basis of the
Supreme Court Decision
Reduced to its lowest legal common denominator, the decision
is of much more far reaching significance than is initially assumed.
Indeed, it is somewhat difficult upon initial consideration of the
problem to understand how two presumably separate and independent
bodies of law, the warranty of seaworthiness and the very nature of
the legal compromise implicit in workmen's compensation acts, would
8 Id. at 206.
9 373 U.S. at 412, 1963 A.M.C. at 1375.
10 Id. at 416, 1963 A.M.C. at 1378.
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ever be maneuvered into such a posture that they would bear down
on each other on such a collision course. Yet, that is exactly what
happened, and the Supreme Court rested its conclusion that liability
should be imposed on the stevedore-employer, Pan-Atlantic, on two
closely interrelated and basic propositions:
1. The warranty of seaworthiness which is traditionally owed by
a shipowner to a seaman, and which through Seas Shzpping Co.
v. Sierackiii was ]udicially interpreted to extend to longshoremen, is paramount, even in the face of specific congressional
legislation.
2. The literal wording of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act must submit to, and thereby undergo
judicial repeal or amendment when its provisions conflict with,
the application of the doctrine of seaworthiness, since it was
the intent of Congress to help longshoremen, and to conclude
otherwise would produce harsh and incongruous economic
results.
Despite the fact that over three years have passed since the Yaka
decision without any intimation of action by the Congress to clarify
the situation, it would be presumptious to assume that the arguments
in opposition to the decision are now moot and purely academic. Too
much is involved which extends far beyond the facts of this particular
accident, and, as some of the recent lower court decisions will reflect,
there is too much that conceivably is yet to come.
When certiorari was granted, none of the parties could reasonably
have anticipated the direction which would be ultimately taken by
the Court in resolving the dispute. Counsel for Reed was fully aware
at the outset that a suit in personam against Waterman as owner or
against Pan-Atlantic as bareboat charterer was in all probability
destined to fail, and there were good reasons for thinking so. There
is established case law that a vessel owner, once it has demised or
bareboat chartered the vessel in a seaworthy condition, is no longer2
personally liable for incidents arising out of its subsequent operation.I
Similarly, an action against Pan-Atlantic would presumably be held
to do violence to the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, since PanAtlantic was the employer of Reed at the time of the accident.
ii

328 U.S. 85 (1946).

12 Cannella v. United States, 179 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1950). See, e.g., Cannella v.

Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1949); Vitozi v. Balboa Shippmg Co., 163
F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1947).
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This latter theory had actually been tried before without success
the same circuit. Reed's counsel, who had also participated in the
Smith13 case, therefore theorized in other directions and fashioned
an argument based on the fact that in Yaka there was a charter and
that the results in Smith protected the employer only when he was
a shipowner, not a bareboat charterer. Thus it was decided to bring
an in rem action against the S.S. Yaka which brought into play its
companion concept, the maritime lien. On the basis of the maritime
lien theory, Reed's counsel urged that the lien arose in favor of the
injured longshoreman when he sustained his injury and that it supported a libel in rem against the vessel proper, even though the
unseaworthmess arose after the ship was transferred by the owner to
the bareboat charterer. It was further contended that tins lien existed
irrespective of the absence of either the personal liability of the
owner, Waterman, or the stevedore-employer, Pan-Atlantic, although
it was conceded by all parties that the question had not been decided
in the Third Circuit. Indeed it was recognized that there was a conflict between the holding of the Second Circuit in Grillea v. United
States14 and the First Circuit in Pichzrillo v. Guzman'5 as to the necessity for personal liability to exist for a breach of warranty of seaworthiness to support a recovery against the S.S. Yaka in rem. It was this
conflict which the parties believed was before the Supreme Court
when certiorari was granted. 10 The Supreme Court, however, found it
unnecessary to pass upon this question when it stated as follows:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether a ship may ever be held
liable for its unseaworthiness where no personal liability can be asserted because, in our view, the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that Pan-Atlantic could not be held personally liable for the unseaworthiness of the sip which caused petitioner's injury 17
Instead, the seven justices proceeded along a dual line of reasoning in
holding (1) the bareboat charterer is personally liable for the unseaworthiness of a chartered vessel, absent explicit statutory exemption,
and such liability will support a libel in rem against the vessel, and
(2) the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's
Act did not insulate Pan-Atlantic from liability for breach of its
warranty of seaworthiness.

in

13 Smith v. Mormacdale, 198 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 908
(1953).
14232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
15290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 698 (1962).
16 371 U.S. 938 (1963).
-17373U.S. 410, 412, 1963 A.M.C. 1373, 1375 (1963).
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In justifying its first conclusion, the Court cited "the broad range
of the 'humanitarian policy'," 18 as motivating the extension of a warranty to longshoremen winch was separate and independent from
any lnd of contract. The Court then referred to its holding in Sieracki,
saying "The Longshoremen's
. Act was not intended to take
away from longshoremen the traditional remedies of the sea, so that
recovery for unseaworthmess could be had notwithstanding the availability of compensation."' 9
Another landmark case, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp.,20 was then used to support the result by reasoning that, if Reed
had been employed by someone other than Pan-Atlantic to load the
S.S. Yaka, he could have sued the sinpowner. The shipowner on a
Ryan indemnity theory could then have shifted the burden of the
longshoremen's recovery to the stevedore-employer. Since the defective pallet had been brought on board the vessel by Pan-Atlantic,
it was responsible for the warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel.
Inasmuch as the economic burden rightflly should be shifted to
Pan-Atlantic, the fact that it employed Reed was of no moment.
Stressing the need to consider economic equality of recovery to the
employee, whether or not the employer was the owner or bareboat
charterer of the vessel (sometimes referred to as the owner pro hac
vice) the Court stated:
Pan-Atlantic would have us hold that petitioner must be completely demed -the traditional and basic protection of the warranty
of seaworthiness simply because Pan-Atlantic was not only the
owner pro hac vice of the ship but was also petitioner's employer. In
making this argument, Pan-Atlantic has not pointed and could not
point to any economic difference between giving relief m this case,
where the owner acted as his own stevedore, and in one m which the
owner hres an independent company In either case, under Ryan, the
burden2 ultimately falls on the company whose fault caused the
injury '

The second point on winch the Court rested its decision was that
the Longshoremen's Act did not insulate the employer-charterer
from liability because of its breach of its warranty of seaworthiness.
The Exclusiveness of Liability Section of the Longshoremen's Act 22
was recognized by the Court when it stated "Pan-Atlantic relies simply
18 Id. at 413, 1963 A.M.C. at 1376.

19 Ibzd.
20 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
21373 U.S. at 414, 1963 A.M.C. at 1377.
2244

Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
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on the literal wording of the statute, and it must be admitted that the
statute on its face lends support to Pan-Atlantic's construction.""3 Yet
the Court indicated that the wording of the statute alone would not
suffice. The resolution of the problem required the statute to be
viewed in the light of the prior Supreme Court decisions such as
Sieracki, Ryan and others. The Court observed that these holdings
had been left unchanged by Congress. The point was then surnmarized by the Court in the following language:
In the light of this whole body of law, statutory and decisional,
only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could
prompt us to ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the traditional, absolute,
and non-delegable obligation
of seaworthiness which it should not be
24
permitted to avoid.
The majority opinion was concluded by a reiteration that the
Longshoremen's Act must be liberally construed in conformance with
its purpose to help longshoremen and in a way which avoids harsh
and incongruous results. This required viewing the matter in the light
of the potential recovery for damages a longshoreman would obtain
in a situation in which his employer is an independent contractor
compared with the instance in which the employer is a shipowner or
bareboat charterer. The desired objective was that the economic burden in either case should be the same. The Exclusiveness of Liability
Section of the Longshoremen's Act was held to have no application in
such a situation, the warranty of seaworthiness owed to a longshoreman by a shipowner or owner pro hac vice as developed by the case
law being superior to and overriding the specific provisions of the
statute passed by Congress.
An Analysis of the Bases on Which the Decision Rests
The Background of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act
As can be readily seen from the reasoning of the Supreme Court,
the immediate result of this controversial decision is the issue of the
propriety of any act of Congress being overriden by the doctrine of
seaworthiness which is a part of the general maritime law in this
country The history of the growth and ultimate constitutionality of
state workmen's compensation statutes is a stormy one. It was argued
23373 U.S. at 414,
24 Id. at 415, 1963

1963 A.M.C. at 1378.
A.M.C. at 1378.
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with some validity that such statutes which nposed liability without
fault on employers for injuries sustained by employees in industrial
accidents violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
However, their constitutionality was finally upheld in New York Central
Railroad v. White25 which involved the New York act, and shortly
thereafter other states passed similar legislation. The decision in favor
of constitutionality was rested on the theory of compromise. The
employer gave up his right to be free from claims in non-fault cases,
and the employee gave up his right to recover large damage verdicts
in cases where fault could be shown and, in exchange, accepted benefits in all work-connected cases which were limited in amount. In
short, there resulted a basic compromise, and this is the theory on
which all compensation acts subsequently enacted have been based.
Insofar as the maritime worker is concerned, complications arose
shortly after the 1917 decision upholding the constitutionality of the
New York Workmen's Compensation Act. In Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen,28 the New York act was held to be unconstitutional when
applied to a longshoreman injured aboard a vessel on navigable waters
as opposed to an injury on land. It was reasoned that the shipboard
injury came within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States and
that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction necessitated a
uniform application of federal maritime law with the power to modify
it resting solely with the Congress and not with the individual state.
After abortive efforts by Congress to correct the situation which again
resulted in a statute being held unconstitutional, 27 the Supreme Court
held in InternationalStevedoring Co. v. Haverty28 that longshoremen
were to be considered as "seamen" within the provisions of the Jones
Act, 29 which had been passed in 1920 for members of crews of vessels,
giving them a cause of action for negligence against their stevedore
employer. It was less than a year after Haverty that Congress passed
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act30 which
specifically provided an exclusive remedy for longshoremen against
their employers, thereby eliminating Haverty which had applied the
Jones Act to longshore injuries. In Crowell v. Benson3i the Supreme
25 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
26 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
27
Washngton v. W C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
28 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
29 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
80 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
8285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.
It can be seen that within a relatively short period of time a number of legislative and judicial actions of significance had taken place.
The constitutionality of state workmen's compensation acts was established. The states had been put on notice through Jensen that the
constitutional grant of admiralty Jurisdiction was to be modified solely
by Congress. Congress by negativing Haverty and passing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act had made it
perfectly clear that there was a sharp distinction between the remedies
afforded to members of crews of vessels and those available to longshoremen and maritime workers. The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act had satisfied the congressional purpose
which was to give maritime workers rights and remedies similar to
those enjoyed under state compensation acts. The basic quid pro quo
was preserved m the exclusiveness of liability provisions contained in
section 532 of the act along with the attendant penalties to be incurred
by the employer if he failed to comply Of special significance was the
explicit statutory language employed by the Congress which took
into account the causes of action in the umque maritime world to
which it was to apply, thereby differentiating it from the more common state compensation act to which admiralty law is at best only
infrequently a consideration.
Section 5. The liability of an employer prescribed in Section 4
shall be excluswe and n place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act, an injured employee,
or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may
elect to claim compensation under this Act, or to maintain an action
at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death.
In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, or that
the injury was due
33
to the contributory negligence of the employee.
The liability prescribed in section 434 which is exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee should be
noted. In return for such limited liability the employer in section 4(a)
3244

Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).

33 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

3444 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
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is liable for and obligated to secure payment of compensation to
his employees and in section 4(b) the employer is obligated to pay
compensation irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury
The Background of the Doctrine of Unseaworthinessand the
Effect of Statutory Law on the General Maritime Law
The nature of the development of the doctrine of unseaworthness
under the general maritime law is of great significance, since the Supreme Court in Yaka has held that as ]udicially interpreted, it is
paramount to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, a specific statute enacted by the Congress of the United
States. It is not the purpose here to trace in detail the doctrine's development, but it is of importance to understand how such a legal remedy
which on its face would seem to be solely applicable to members of
the crews of vessels ultimately was held to be extended to longshoremen and certain other maritime workers.
The landmark case of The Osceola,35 set forth that "the vessel and
her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for m]uries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the
proper appliances appurtenant to the shnp."3 6 Although it is true
that there was significant litigation over indemnity for unseaworthiness, prior to 1920, passage of the Jones AcO7 m that year based on
negligence resulted in the doctrine of unseaworthmness falling into
substantial disuse. Nevertheless, the shipowner's obligation for the
furmshng of a seaworthy vessel was assumed to be limited to members of the vessel's crew, and this point of view was to continue for the
next forty-three years. However, in 1946 Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki 8 was announced by the Supreme Court, and by this decision
the warranty of seaworthiness was extended to longshoremen. The
rationale of the case was based upon the conclusion that a longshoreman working aboard ship performing a seaman's work and incurring
a seaman's hazards should be entitled to a seaman's protection. In
that case, Sieracki sustained injuries while operating a winch on a
vessel when a shackle supporting the boom broke causing certain of
the ship's gear to fall and injure him.
The term "seaman" was further broadened in Pope & Talbot,Inc. v.
35 189 U.S. 158 (1903).

36Id. at 175.

37 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
38328

U.S. 85 (1946).
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Hawn30 to apply to a carpenter-employee of a repairman who was
found to satisfy the test of performing work traditionally done by seamen when injured on board the vessel. Inasmuch as longshoremen
had traditionally possessed a cause of action for negligence in rem
against the vessel itself, 40 and Hawn had recognized the status of longshoremen as business mvitees aboard ship for the right to sue the
shipowner for negligence, it appeared that longshoremen had achieved
essential equality with members of crews of vessels. Not only did
they have their absolute right to compensation from the employer
under the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act, they possessed a
cause of action for unseaworthmess as well as for negligence against
the third party-vessel owner. The problem which was to arise in
Yaka was to stem from a situation in which the employer and the
vessel owner were one and the same.
It is of interest to note the attitude of the Supreme Court in other
cases in which congressional power to shape the general maritime
law has been a subject of discussion. Perhaps one of the most cogent
expressions of congressional power to shape maritime law is found in
Washington v. W C. Dawson & Co.,41 which was recently cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.4 In
Washington the Court stated as follows:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the
maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will
and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a
general employer's liability law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several
states. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
looks to uni43
formity; otherwise wide discretion is left to Congress.
Examples of other instances in which the Supreme Court has
recognized its role and has confined its efforts within proper bounds
include Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co. 44 wherein statutory construction as well as humanitarian policy of the Longshoremen's Act
were weighed by Mr. Justice Minton:
We are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend the
statute by inserting therein before the word "injury" the word "coin39 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
40 The General DeSoms, 179 Fed. 123 (W.D. Wash. 1910); The Anaces, 93 Fed.
240 (4th Cir. 1899).
41 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
42 370 U.S. 114, 118 (1962).
43264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924). (Emphasis added.)
44342 U.S. 197 (1958).
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pensable" so as to make "injury" read as ifitwere "disability"
Congress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year
from date of injury, and "injury" does not mean "disability."
We are aware that this is a humanitarianact, and that it should be
construed liberally to effectuate its purposes; but that does not give
us the power to rewrite the statute of limitations at will, and make
While
what was intended to be a limitation no limitation at all
it might be desirable for the statute to provide as petitioners contend,
the power to change the statute is with Congress, not us. 45
Or, consider Thompson v. Lawson46 in which the same court reafrmed the principle in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
Our concern is with the proper interpretation of the Federal Longshoremen's Act. Congress might have provided in that act that a woman is entitled to compensation so long as she is still deemed to be
the lawful wife of the decedent under State law, as, for example,
where a foreign divorce obtained by her is without constitutional validity in the forum State. But Congress did not do so. It defined the
requirements which every claimant for compensation must meet
47

There would thus seem to be no question but that a congressional
statute would be paramount to the general maritime law Yet, in Yaka
the line of reasoning previously followed by the Supreme Court was
abandoned in favor of other considerations.
The Nature of the Arguments Advanced in Support of and in
Opposition to the Decision
It is impossible in a limited space to review all aspects of the
arguments for and against the Yaka result. Yet, examination of a few
of these issues will serve to illustrate the nature of the Pandora's box
which the decision already has opened up for courts to cope with.
It is clear that there is a basic and genuine desire on the part of
any court to see that an equitable result is reached in a given case.
On the surface there is great visceral appeal to the argument in Yaka
that an injured longshoreman who is employed by the shipowner
should have the same right of recovery when injured as the longshoreman-employee of an independent contractor. This is the basic
argument of the supporters of the decision. Yet, this proposition is
not the vice of Yaka. What is contested by the practitioner is the
manner in which it was accomplished. Persuasive arguments are ad45 Id.

at 199-200. (Emphasis added.)
46 347 U.S. 334 (1954).
47Id. at 336. (Emphasis added.)
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vanced that the impact of Yaka flouts the will of Congress, overrides
a specific congressional statute, renders the remainder of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act suspect by casting doubt as to the linguistic meaning and workability of other
sections of the act, destroys the traditional quid pro quo which is an
integral part of all compensation acts and, at least, poses the question
as to whether or not the act as so interpreted is constitutional.
The counter-arguments are to the effect that such objections are
basically related to form and ignore substance. The supporters castigate those who oppose the Yaka result as engaging in legal techmcalities and cries of judicial legislation which Yaka has seen fit to slice
through in order to achieve an equitable result. Certain aspects of the
Yaka decision are therefore worthy of consideration in this respect.
Apart from the statutory language with respect to the exclusiveness of liability of the employer contained in section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, it is important to
note the obvious congressional intent that this provision of the act
applied to all liability of the employer to the.employee who attempts
to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death. Inasmuch as state workmen's compensation acts are based on the employer gaining a benefit by giving
up his right to be free from claims in non-fault cases, and the employee giving up his right to recover large damage verdicts in cases
where fault could be shown, these acts have basically related to negligence situations.
With the doctrine of unseaworthmess being a species of absolute
liability and therefore not predicated on fault, the theory has been
advanced that the Supreme Court opinion in Yaka can be justified on
the grounds that section 5 of the act did not pertain to unseaworthiness, but only to negligence. It is submitted that there are several
reasons why such a conclusion is unsound. The legislative history of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act has
made it abundantly clear that Congress was fully aware of what it was
doing when it fashioned the statutory language of Section 5. At the
1956 hearings on bills relating to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,4 8 Arthur Larsen, Under Secretary of

Labor, testified that:
It is a very well balanced and common sense arrangement.
The other major portion of the Act which is involved in some of
8
4S
Hearings on Bills Relating to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 23, 24, and June 11, 1956).
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these bills is the exclusiveness of liability clause. The idea of that
clause, of course, is that in the institution of workmen's compensation,
there is a quid pro quo between the employer and the employee. The
employer gave up his right to be immune from nonfault liability He
assumed liability for many accidents for which he was m no sense,
morally or legally, liable. At the same time, as a sort of exchange for
this, he was given immunity from damage suits at common law or
otherwise. And so, from the employee's point of view, the employee
acqired an assured payment of medical expenses plus a portion of
his lost wages, regardless of the employer's fault, and at the same time
he gave up
the right to ste his employer and acquire a large damage
9
verdict.4
Bearing in mind that these hearings took place some eleven years
after Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracks,5 it scarcely behooves those who
defend the decision m Yaka to attempt to justify it on the grounds the
basic quid pro quo between employee and employer did not include
the warranty of seaworthiness. It goes without saying that such an
arrangement under today's maritime decisions would constitute no
compromise at all. The real issue concerns the employer's status. Is
his liability to the employee now to be measured in determinable
amounts under the provisions of the act, or is he to be subject to suits
for unlimited damages, despite the language of the act?
In considering the 1959 amendment to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to increase benefits for disabling
injuries, the following language was stressed.
This deflects from the principle of quid pro quo, which basically
supports all workmen's compensation legislation as a system to supplant or substitute for the employees' former right of action for damages against his (sic) employer.
This enabled the employee to receive compensation in every instance of work connected injury, but at the same time he relinquished
his right to sue his employer and perhaps receive considerably greater
damages. In return, the employer's potential liability was reduced in
accordance with the provisions of the law 51
Lastly, it was quite apparent that Congress was well aware that
a Yaka fact situation could easily arise. Before the hearings of the subcommittee which heard Secretary Larsen, Mr. Albert E. Rice, counsel
for American Merchant Marine Institute, testified as follows:
Shipowners are vitally interested in these bills. In some cases shipowners are actually the direct employers of longshoremen and otherharbor workers. In other cases the work of these men is performed
4o Hearings, supra note 48, at 16. (Emphasis added.)
GO328 U.S. 85 (1946).
51 H.R. REP. No. 2067, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956).
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through independent contractors. In all cases, however, the ultimate
economic cost is borne by the shipowners. 52
In no compensation act other than the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is the language "at law or in admiralty"'5 3 to be found in the comparable exclusiveness of liability provisions. There can be no question but that such specific statutory
language was meant to encompass maritime theories of recovery employed in admiralty actions as well as in civil actions which until the
the recent amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 were
carried on separate dockets. Any other conclusion would vitiate the
quid pro quo compromise without which no compensation act could
survive or gain support from employee or employer.
As has been pointed out previously, the Supreme Court stressed
the fact that its result m Yaka was clearly supported by the decisions
in

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki5 5 and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-

Atlantic Steamship Corp.56 It is submitted, however, that these decisions do not support the Yaka result. The Court in Sierackz stated as
follows:
We may take it therefore that Congress intended the remedy of
compensation to be exclusively against the employer. See Swanson v.
Marra Bros.,
328 U.S. 1. But we cannot assume, in the face of the
Act's explicit provisions, that it intended this -remedy to nullify or
affect others against third persons. Exactly the opposite is true. The

legislation therefore did not nullify any right of the longshoreman

against the owner of the ship, except possibly in the instance, presumably rare, where he may be hired by the owner. The statute had

no purpose or effect57 to alter the stevedores rights as against any but
his employer alone.
The Supreme Court further reiterated its clear understanding of
the act's explicit provisions when set forth in Ryan, the landmark case
relating to the shipowner's right of indemnity against the stevedore
as a result of the stevedore's breach of its implied warranty of workmanlike service, when it stated as follows:
The obvious purpose of this provmon5 is to make the statutory
liability of an employer to contribute to its employee's compensation
the exclusive liability of such employer to its employee, or to anyone
Hearnngs, supra note 48, at 23. (Emphasis added.)
Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
FED. R. Crv. P. § 1.
55 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
56 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
57 328 U.S. at 102. (Emphasis added.)
58 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). (Footnote not m original.)
52

5344
54
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claiming under or through such employee, on account of his injury or
death arising out of that employment. In return, the employee, and
those claiming under or through him, are given a substantial quid pro
quo in the form of an assured compensation, regardless of fault, as a
substitute for their excluded claim. On the other hand, the Act prescribes no quid pro quo for a shipowner that is compelled to pay a
judgment obtained against it for the full amount of a longshoreman's
damages.
Section 5 of the Act expressly excludes the liability of the employer
"to the employee," or others entitled to recover "on account of such
[employee's] injury or death." Therefore, in the instant case, it excludes the liability of the stevedoring contractor to its longshoremen,
and to his In, for damages on account of the longshoreman's injuries.
At the same time, however, § 5 expressly preserves to each employee
a right to recover damages against third persons.59
In addition, Mr. Justice Black who wrote the majority opinion in
Yaka observed in a vigorous dissent in Ryan:
That Act was revolutionary in its field. It took away from longshoremen the right to sue their employers for negligence and substituted a fixed schedule of compensation for injuries regardless of fault
Congress weighed the conflicting interests of employers and employees and struck what was considered to be a fair and constitutional
balance. Injured employees thereby lost their chance to get large tort
verdicts against their employers, but gained the right to get a sure
though frequently a more modest recovery However, § 33 did leave
employees a chance to recover extra tort damages from third persons
who negligently injured them. And while Congress imposed absolute
liability on employers, they were also accorded counterbalancing advantages. They were no longer to be subjected to the hazards of large
tort verdicts. Under no circumstances were they to be held liable to
their own employees for more than the compensation clearly fixed by
the Act. Thus employers were given every reason to believe that they
could buy their insurance and make other business 0arrangements on
the basis of the limited Compensation Act liability 6
The language of Mr. Justice Black referring solely to negligence
to the exclusion of unseaworthmess has been advanced as a basis for
supporting the Yaka result. This is not a proper interpretation when
considered in the full light of his dissent and a majority opinion in
Ryan, nor could it be reconciled with Sierackz or the legislative history
of section 5 of the act. More particularly, such an argument summarily
fails in view of section 5"s explicit provisions to govern the employer's
liability to the employee for damages recoverable from such employer
"at law or in admiralty."
59 350 U.S. at 129-30. (Emphasis added m part.)
60 Id.at 140. (Emphasis added.)
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The argument has also been advanced that Ryan actually constituted as flagrant a violation of section 5 of the act as did Yaka, and
that, inasmuch as Congress did nothing subsequent to the Ryan decision in 1956, such an action constituted tacit approval of the Court's
interpretation of the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. It is submitted that this is not accurate, since the
point of law decided in Ryan has no application to the employeremployee relationship under the act. The issue in that case was
whether or not the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's Act would preclude an action for indemnity by the shipowner against the stevedore-employer, the stevedore having urged
section 5 as a defense to the shipowner's action over. The Supreme
Court then drew a very clear cut distinction and held that section 5
related solely to the limitation of liability as between employee and
employer which did not extend to the relationship between the employer and the shipowner. Ryan did not present a situation prohibited
by section 5. Rather, it presented a situation permitted by section 33.
The opinion bears out this point:
While the Compensation Act protects a stevedoring contractor
from actions brought against it by its employee on account of the
contractor's tortious conduct causing injury to the employee, the
contractor has no logical ground for relief from the full consequences
of his independent contractual obligation, voluntarily assumed to the
shipowner, to load the cargo properly 61
Yaka, on the other hand, presented a situation expressly proscribed
by the act. Reed, in actuality, sued his employer to impose liability
beyond the provisions of the Longshoreman's Act, and but for the
Court holding that the doctrine of seaworthiness was paramount to
the specific provisions of the act on equitable grounds, would have
found no support, either in Ryan, Sierackt or any other reported
decision.
Space does not permit an examination of all of the provisions of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as affected by Yaka. Inasmuch as the objective of the decision was to
achieve economic equality in terms of monetary recovery by an injured longshoreman working for a shipowner-employer when compared to his potential recovery in a true third party action while
working for an independent contractor, the decision's effect upon
certain provisions of the act, is worthy of examination.
The foremost indication of the motivating force behind Yaka is to
61 Id. at 131.
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be found in the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan who states that "the
Court is frank to admit the real reason for its position is that a contrary result would make little economic sense after the decision in
Ryan
. "62 It is submitted that for the reasons previously stated
Ryan does not support Yaka, and the consideration of what constitutes
"economic sense" actually is one of social policy The majority opinion
touches upon economics in two instances, the first relating to Ryan's
placement of the burden on a stevedore employer in an indemnity
action by the shipowner, and the second when it stated, "Pan-Atlantic
has not pointed and could not point to any economic difference between giving relief in this case, where the owner acted as his own
stevedore, and in one in which the owner hires an independent company In either case, under Ryan, the burden ultimately falls on the
the company whose default causes the injury "63

The economic equality argument on the surface is understandable,
and, as has been stated, the quarrel is not with the Court's objective
to achieve equal monetary recovery for the injured longshoreman
when his employer is a shipowner. The dispute is over the manner
in which it has been done. If the economic equality argument is to
be the basis on which Yaka is to be justified, then in all fairness it
ought to be applied to all of the litigants, both plaintiff and defendant.
The injustice to the employer who is also a party to tus quid pro quo
can best be seen upon an examination of selective provisions of the
Longshoremen's Act which reveals that the decision in Yaka has
actually resulted in economic superiority of the Yaka claimant when
compared with the position of the longshoreman-employee of the
independent contractor who is suing a third party shipowner. This
situation is most sharply illustrated in sections 33(f) and 33(g) of

the act.
(f) If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings
within the period prescribed in section 33(b) the employer shall be
required to pay as compensation under tus Act a sum equal to the
excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on
account of such injury or death over the amount recovered against
such third person.64
(g) If compromise with such third person is made by the person
entitled to compensation or such representative of an amount less
than the compensation to which such person or representative would
be entitled to under this Act, the employer shall be liable for compen62373

U.S. 410, 418, 1963 A.M.C. 1373, 1380 (1963).

63 Id. at 414, 1963 A.M.C. at 1377.
6444 Stat. 1441 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (1964).
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sation as determined in subdivision (f) only if such compromise is
made with his written approval.6 5
The provisions of section 33(f) pertain to a situation in which
the employee files a damage suit against the third party and pursues
it to judgment. If his recovery in the damage suit is less than he would
have obtained in compensation, he is entitled to obtain the difference
in amount from his employer in the form of additional compensation.
The provisions of section 33(g) refer to a settlement or compromise
which an employee may voluntarily make with the third party As
frequently happens, the employee, following receipt of compensation,
or while receiving compensation under the provisions of the act,
effects a compromise or settlement of the third party claim with the
third party who under section 33(a) is defined as "some person other
than the employer." Under the provisions of 33(g) a third party
settlement exposes the employer to the payment of further compensation "only if such compromise is made with his written approval."
The purposes of these provisos of sections 33(f) and 33(g) are to
achieve a basically fair result to both employee and employer by
balancing the equities. If the employee chooses to sue the third party,
he can do so, and he is protected to the extent of the compensation to
which he might demonstrate that he is entitled, if hIs damage suit
does not match expectations. By the same token if the employee is
able to effect a compromise and settle hs third party action to his
satisfaction, the employer is protected from paying additional compensation, unless he participates directly in the settlement by giving
his written approval.
What obviously can occur is that, if pursuant to section 33(g) a
settlement with the Yaka employer-shipowner is effected by the
employee in an amount less than the compensation to which such
person or representative would possibly be entitled to under the act,
the employer can be accused of extending written consent by participating in the entry of a final judgment based on the settlement. By
invoking the specific langauge of the statute, the employee can contend, and it conceivably can be held, that additional compensation
and medical benefits are owed, despite the fact that bona fide efforts
were made to agree to a settlement which was viewed as equitable to
all concerned and which was intended to terminate both the compensation claim and the litigation once and for all. It is a paradox that
this situation can arise through the application of the specific statu6544 Stat. 1441 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1964).
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tory language of section 33(g) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, the very procedure the Supreme Court
refused to be bound by in Yaka m order to reach its economic equality
result. Thus the decision possesses greater ramifications than are apparent from the narrow confines of the issues considered by the Supreme Court. The result is that the Yaka employer has no statutory
protection which is present in true third party settlements. The viability and workability of a congressional compensation statute which
also serves as the compensation act for the District of Columbia is
cast in doubt. Furthermore, the basic quid pro quo on which all compensation acts have been based and ]ustified as a sound compronnse
for employee and employer alike is jeopardized by the employment of
reasoning which encourages the ignoring of statutory language when
it fails to comport with the desired result in a given case.
It is perhaps premature at this stage in the development of the
Yaka doctrine to do more than pose the question as to whether or not
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court has, m truth, so undermined
the basic quid pro quo between employer and employee that it is
thereby rendered unconstitutional. If it has not, what compensating
advantage is there for the shipowner-employer to continue to subscribe to workmen's compensation coverage in such situations when it
will be sued for damages anyway? If there is to be no limit of liability
as to the employer when a shipowner, is the employer-slpowner not
as well off defending each claim on its merits? If the employer fails
to take out workmen's compensation coverage in Yaka situations,
thereby resulting in the employer being stripped of its legal defenses
pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act,"0 is the employer, when a shipowner, being accorded the benefit
7
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
8 the Supreme Court faced the issue of the
In Crowell v. Benson,6
constitutionality of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. In holding the statute constitutional, the Court pointed
out that there were two limitations in the act that were fundamental.
The first pertained to the payment of compensation for disability or
death occurring on navigable waters. The second fundamental limita00 44 Stat 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
67 As to the constitutionality of compensation acts m general, see New York Cent
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S.
219 (1917).
68 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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tion related to the application of the act only when the employeremployee relationship existed in which case liability would be exclusive unless the employer failed to secure payment of compensation.
If tis second limitation pertaining to exclusiveness of liability was
viewed at that time as fundamental and utilized as a basis for concluding that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act was constitutional, what occurs if the exclusiveness of liability
provision no longer serves to insulate the employer-shipowner in the
light of Reed v. Yaka? No court to date has concerned itself with this
aspect of the problem, but it would seem inevitable that such a consideration will ultimately make its appearance.
Selective Cases Interpreting Reed v. S.S. Yaka
Dectsions Pertaining to the Nature of the Action
Entirely apart from the correctness or mcorrectness of the Yaka
decision, it remains a Supreme Court pronouncement which courts
must strive to interpret and apply That judges have proceeded with
caution is not altogether unanticipated when it is considered that
while they long have been accustomed to dealing with basic principles
of compensation law, such considerations have been separate and
apart from any joint application of the doctrine of unseaworthmess
under the general maritime law With the advent of Yaka, this is no
longer the case.
The earliest cases subsequent to this controversial opinion by the
Supreme Court dealt basically with the form which the action would
take. A number of variables were in need of clarification, inasmuch as
Yaka had been a proceeding in rem against a vessel operated by an
owner pro hac vice solely on the theory of unseaworthiness. The
problem of what would happen if one or more of these mgredients
were missing or altered remained.
The question of the in personam liability of the employer in the
Yaka context has been at issue in several cases. In Kanton v. Grace
Line, Inc.69 a personal injury suit was initially urged by the injured
longshoreman against the employer-shipowner in the form of an
action in personam and was dismissed on motion, the district court
refusing to "anticipate the reaction of the Supreme Court."70 Thereafter the suit was brought as a libel in rem, and following the entry
09 234 F Supp. 409 (W.D. Wash. 1964), aff'd per curtain, 366 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3234 (U.S. January 9, 1967).
70 Id. at 411.
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of judgment m favor of the longshoreman, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the action as being indistinguishable from Yaka.71 In Hertel v. Amerwan Export Lines, Inc.,72 however, the action was brought on the civil
side in personam, and the defendant urged that Yaka was to be distinguished because it was an in rem action. The court concluded that
the distinction was invalid, inasmuch as Yaka imposed personal liability upon the stevedore-employer when a bareboat charterer or owner
pro hac vice of the vessel. Further litigation on the same point has
included Miculka v. American Mail Line" in which the plaintiff filed
one suit m personam against the stevedore-employer who was also
bareboat charterer of the vessel, which suit was ultimately removed
from state to federal court, and a second suit in admiralty in rem
against the vessel. Both actions were urged solely on the theory of
unseaworthmess. The court initially dismssed the in personam suit
and permitted the in rem action to remain, concluding that it alone
fell within the ambit of Yaka. Later in Course v. Pacific Inland Nay.
Co.,74 however, the same district court revised its previous opinion in
Miculka and held that an in personam action could be pursued against
the employer-shipowner for unseaworthmess, but not for negligence
under the Jones Act.
The argument that Yaka applies only to an owner pro hac vice has
been advanced in a bona fide effort to hold the line rigidly on the
Yaka facts. Actually an attempt had been made in a pre-Yaka suit to
hold the true vessel owner in Smith v. Mormacdale.7 Reed's counsel
had sought to avoid Smith by advancing the charter theory as a controlling distinction, but the Supreme Court decision in Yaka rests on
other grounds. The recent case of Peros v. Grace Line, Inc.7 6 casts
aside the argument that Yaka applies only to the owner pro hac vice
and not to the true vessel owner. Again, the broad reaches of the
economic equality argument as pronounced in Yaka have overridden
such attempts to delimit the application of the decision.
With Yaka proclaimig that the injured longshoreman was to be
placed in a positon so that he was economically equal with a similar
employee who was suing a true third party, the inquiry inevitably
arose as to whether such equality included an-acton for negligence
as well as one for unseaworthmess. The district court m Course v.
71366 F.2d at 511.
72225 F Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
73 229 F Supp. 665 (D. Ore. 1964).
74234 F Supp. 676 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 368 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1966).
75198 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 908 (1953).
762 55 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Pacific Inland Nay. Co.77 observed in its opinion that the owner must
always answer for its "common-law or maritime negligent hurt to
persons rightfully transacting business on his ship,"78 but the validity
of an ordinary negligence count m a Yaka suit was not passed upon,
since it had not been urged. The circuit court opimon79 casts little
additional light on the point, preferring to rely upon the affirmance
of the libelant's unseaworthmess claim. However, the case of Biggs
v. Norfolk Dredging Co.80 seems to view favorably a Yaka suit which
incorporates a count for negligence as well as one for unseaworthmess.
In so concluding, the court stated what is basically consistent with the
Yaka thesis, "that a seaman-employee, actual or Sierackz, injured
aboard his employer's vessel is to be put in the same position as one
injured aboard a ship owned by a third party, and in the latter situaation, the employee could recover compensation from his employer
and still sue the third party for negligence or unseaworthmess."81
This language is somewhat misleading, however, in suggesting that
an "actual" seaman can sue his employer for ordinary negligence
under the Yaka doctrine. The "actual" seaman referred to is presumably a member of the crew, and as such the normal remedy that he
would assert for the negligence of his employer is under the Jones
Act.82 Assuming that there is no question as to his status, such a
person does not possess rights under the Longshoremen's Act and
hence cannot be a Yaka plaintiff.
Despite the difficulties encountered in dissecting certain aspects
of Biggs, which was discussed above in another context, it would appear to be the sounder view that the remedies available to a Yaka
candidate do not mclude the Jones Act83 which has been consistently
interpreted as available only to members of the crews of vessels. This
was early held by the Supreme Court in Swanson v. Marra,84 and was
reaffirmed in a Yaka context in Hertel v. American Export Lines.85
This position is consistent with the provisions of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act8 as well as with those of
77234 F Supp. 676 (D. Ore. 1964).
781d. at 679 n.5.

79 368 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1966).

80 360 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1966).
81 Id.at 365.
8241 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
83 Ibzd.
84328 U.S. 1 (1946).
85225 F Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); accord, Aycock v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 236
F Supp. 360 (S.D. Tex. 1964).

8644 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
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compensation acts m general which make the benefits of such an act
mutually exclusive from those available to a Master or members of the
crew of vessels."'
The state courts have also not escaped the reverberations of Yaka.
Such a case is Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. 88 Jackson involved an
action by the widow of a deceased longshoreman who sustained fatal
injuries when he inhaled noxious fumes m the hold of a vessel owned
by his employer. Suit was filed m the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, seeking recovery, in the alternative, under the Jones Act, "' the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Act 9 0 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,9'
the Louisiana Civil Code 2 and the general maritime law The shipowner pleaded exceptions of no cause of action on several theories:
(1) the Jones Act provides a remedy only for seamen who are either
Masters or members of the crew and not longshoremen; (2) the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply to a longshoreman injured or killed aboard a vessel in navigable waters; (3)
since the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
provides the exclusive remedy under such circumstances the plaintiff
possessed no cause of action under the Louisiana Civil Code; and
(4) there exists no cause of action for wrongful death under the
general maritime law Additionally, the jurisdiction of the state court
was challenged by the shipowner, who contended that Louisiana
courts possess no jurisdiction under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.
The trial court sustained the defendant's exceptions and dismissed
the plaintiffs suit. 93 On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
State of Louisiana, the court wrote extensively Commencing with the
observation that the basic question to be resolved was whether the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act or whether she might litigate in the state
court under the other legal theories urged, the court concluded that
the exclusiveness of liability provisions94 of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act governed. Inasmuch as the fatal
87

88

See, e.g., TEX. RE;v. CIrv. STAT. Abw., arts. 8306-09 (1956).
185 So. 2d 342 (La. App.), writ refused, 187 So. 2d 441 (La. 1966).

89 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
90
LA. REv. STAT. ANi. §§ 23:1021-1351 (1964).
91 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
92 Arts. 667, 670, 2315, 2317, 2320, 2322.
93 185 So. 2d at 343.
9444 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
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injuries were sustained on navigable waters, the "twilight zone"
doctrine95 whereby an injured employee might choose between a
federal or state compensation remedy was denied application. In
analyzing Yaka, the court concluded that the act had been "taken
upon the judicial anvil and hammered into an unexpected shape"9
and that the Supreme Court decision is authority only for the proposition that an injured longshoreman may bring an admiralty action in rem
under the general maritime law in federal court. The court concluded:
"In any event, we are of the opinion that it exemplifies more judicial
integrity to conclude that the rationale emanating from Yaka merely
permits a longshoreman to bring an action m rem against his employer
in the federal court."97
Application for rehearing was denied and thereafter the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in a five to two decision denied an application
for writ-of certiorari, finding no error of law in the prior judgment 99
The two dissenting judges in supporting their opinon0 ° that a writ
should be granted relied upon Robinson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.1 1
Robinson in a longshoreman's personal injury suit had similarly held
that the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act precluded an in personain
action against the employer and had construed Yaka as permitting
only an in rem action against the vessel owned by the employer. The
dissenting judge in Robinson,102 recognizing that the courts holding
was contrary to Yaka and the then recent case of Hertel v. American
Export Lines,103 felt that the writ should be granted to resolve the
issue, but without success. Petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Louisiana courts has
now been granted in Jackson,0 4 thereby giving the court an opportunity to reappraise its holding in Yaka.
95 See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962); Davis v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
96 185 So. 2d at 345.
97 Ibzd.
981d. at 342.
99 187 So. 2d 441 (La. 1966).
1oo Ibid.
10i 170 So. 2d 243 (La. App.), writ refused, 247 La. 481, 172 So. 2d 292 (1965).
102 247 La. at 481, 172 So. 2d at 292.
10 225 F Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
104 87 S. Ct. 502 (1966). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 35 U.S.L.
Week 4391 (May 8, 1967). [Ed.]
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A Closer Analysis of the Decision in
Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Company
In an area of the law which admittedly is fraught with multiple
hazards and confusion, the most all encompassing, and in some ways
the most perplexing, case from a circuit court to date is Biggs v.
Norfolk Dredging Co.10 5 The opinion relates to two suits resulting
from similar incidents involving shoreside employees injured on
vessels. After obtaining compensation benefits, both brought damage suits based on the alternative theories of recovery that they
were either Jones Act seamen or Yaka candidates. In Biggs, a dredging employee had received state workmen's compensation and had
thereafter applied for and obtained additional benefits. In Clowers,
the second suit, a general laborer filed a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act which ultimately proceeded to a formal hearing and resulted in a formal award of
compensation. On motions for summary judgment, the suits were
dismissed by the federal district court. The district court concluded
in Biggs that the action of the Virgina Industrial Commission in
approving Biggs' claim on three separate occasions was res judicata
and that the state commissioner's findings that Biggs' regular employment was shipyard work were sufficient to constitute a finding of
jurisdiction. Additionally, the court concluded that Yaka as a remedy
was available only to longshoremen, which automatically excluded
this dredging employee. The court reasoned m Clowers that the
formal hearing and subsequent award under the Longshoremens and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act which was fully paid carried with
it a presumption of jurisdiction under such act which could not be
collaterally attacked by asserting a subsequent Jones Act suit.
On appeal both cases were reversed, and the opimon's fall significance may not be .fully discernible for some time. Some confusion is
initially apparent from the courts interpretation of the Yaka holding
as one permitting the employee to sue the shipowner or owner pro hac
vice for maintenance and cure as well as for damages under the general maritime law, notwithstanding the fact that neither employee
was a member of a crew and both had previously received workmen's
compensation benefits. 1 6 Of greater overall significance, perhaps, is
the fact that the res ]udicata theory urged in Biggs and the election
or estoppel theory relied upon in Clowers appear to give way to
'05 360 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1966).
1o6 Id. at 363.
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the principle that Yaka will not permit a compensation act with its
exclusiveness of liability provisions for the protection of the employer
to deprive an employee of his historical maritime rights.
Tis principle is qualified in the opinion to some extent when the
employee is attempting to characterize his status as a member of
the crew of a vessel. In such instances estoppel by judgment to assert
a Jones Act suit is not ruled out if there is an election by the employee
Act and
during the compensation proceedings to sue under the Jones
10 7 and Smith
Co.
Fruit
United
v.
Hagens
Indeed,
litigated.
is
the issue
v. Service Contracting,Inc.1°8 are cited m the footnote, 0 9 presumably
to point up the instances in which the doctrine would apply Hagens
had held that a formal order issued by a deputy comnnissioner following a formal hearing was sufficient to preclude a subsequent suit by
the claimant under the Jones Act. Smith, on the other hand, held that
voluntary acceptance of a federal compensation award did not constitute res judicata or estoppel to a Jones Act suit when a deputy
comnussioner held no hearing and there was indeed no adversary
proceeding. Had the question of jurisdiction been raised and litigated,
the opinion is clear that such final determination by a deputy commissioner would have been res judicata. However, the court reasons
in Biggs that the true Yaka employee cannot be barred ipso facto
from his damage suit remedy by any administrative finding or award,
the rationale again being the economic equality thesis analogizing
the recovery in a Yaka fact situation to that obtainable against a true
third party shipowner. Although the opinion is admittedly somewhat
difficult to dissect due to the intermingling of discussion of the Jones
Act, the Sieracki10 and Yaka opinions, it does appear that the court
proceeds throughout on the basis that both negligence and unseaworthiness are available remedies to a Yaka claimant.
Whether suit is brought by the employee in the capacity of a Jones
Act seaman or as a Sierackz seaman, the court makes it clear that the
burden is one for the employee to support such entitlement by
proving his true character of employment. The court viewed the two
remedies, compensation benefits and the damage suit as complementary, but under no circumstances is there to be a double recovery.
The court further concludes that whether the employee's suit precedes
or is filed after the compensation claim is mnaterial, as the spirit of
135 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1943).
236 F Supp. 492 (E.D. La. 1964).
109 360 F.2d at 365.
110 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
107
108
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Yaka requires that the legal remedy and recovery be equated with
that which would be available if a third party actually owned the
vessel.
As for settlement of Yaka type suits, the specific language of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act obviously
never contemplated the Yaka problem. Consequently, the precise
means of terminating third party litigation and the legal consequences
that have been construed to flow from such termination under the
language of the act, particularly section 33(g), cannot be squared
with the situation of a direct employee suing his employer-shipowner
for unlimited damages. The court in Biggs touches on the question of
settlement by observing that the employee "may settle and relinquish
his claim by a release surviving the exacting scrutiny of admiralty""'
and cites Garrettv. Moore-McCoraWk Co." 2 as supporting authority

Garrett was a maintenance case and dealt with the relationship
of a seaman to a slhpowner and the necessity that the seaman receive
adequate consideration and fully understand his legal rights at the
time that the release was executed. The test of the validity of a release,
irrespective of the form involved, would be that utilized in the maritime law of releases which has been applied, not only to members
13
of the crews of vessels, but also to longshoremen injured on a vessel.
It would therefore appear that Biggs, utilizing the principle of economic equality contained in Yaka, subscribes to some procedure which
will permit litigation to be terminated once and for all. This relates
to the problem originally raised concerning settlement pursuant to
section 33(g) of the Longshoremen's Act which, if literally read and
interpreted, would completely deprive the employer-shipowner of any
possibility of settlement of such a suit, since he would be determined
to have given written approval to such a settlement by the entry of
the agreed judgment. A settlement pursuant to Garrettwould appear
to be one which is reasonable, alerts the shoreside employee to his
legal rights and carries no taint of overreaching. Such settlement
would also serve to bring to an end all litigation including the compensation claim, despite the absence of specific statutory language in
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to spell
out and thereby implement such a result in a Yaka suit.
11

360 F.2d at 365.

112 317 U.S. 239, 247-48, 1942 A.M.C. 1645, 1651-52 (1942).

113 See Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, 111 F.2cd 263 (5th Cir. 1940) (a pre-Yaka
opinion).
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The Hazards Inherent in the Reed v. S.S. Yaka Decision
It is indeed noteworthy that a decision such as Yaka, reached by
an overriding of the specific language of a congressional statute m
order to achieve an ostensibly equitable result, could create such
reverberations in other factual and statutory contexts. An example is
Antero Perez Rodriguez v. Alcoa S.S. Co., an unreported case from
the United States District Court in Puerto Rico which is presently
under submission to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit as Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Antero Perez Rodriguez.114 In this case
the longshoreman, a direct employee of Alcoa, was injured on board
the S.S. Alcoa Roamer on navigable waters.within the territorial limits
of Puerto Rico. Compensation pursuant to the provisions of the
Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act"i5 was awarded
following which Rodriguez filed an in rem action against the vessel
claiming that it was unseaworthy The vessel owner ified exceptions
to the libel alleging that the longshoreman's only remedy was in the
form of compensation, but these were demed by the district court.
On rehearing the district court reaffirmed its position in Rodriguez
as well as in two other cases considered concurrently in which the
same points of law were involved. 16 The case was ultimately submitted for decision on stipulated facts, and the district court entered
a decree in favor of the injured longshoreman, holding that the vessel
was unseaworthy and that the in rem action was not barred by the
exclusiveness of remedy provision of the Puerto Rico Workmen's
117
Compensation Act.
The basis of the shipowner's exceptions was that the case fell solely
under the exclusive provisions of the Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act which is not identical in language to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Carrying
the argument a step further, the shipowner pointed out that Congress
pursuant to the Second Puerto Rican Orgamc Act of 191718 gave
Puerto Rico general legislative power over its own waters and that
the legislature was entitled to enact its own workmen's compensation act for maritime employees to the exclusion of the maritime law
114 No. 6787 in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
115 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-140 (1962).
116 These three cases were placed on the admiralty docket of the United States
District Court in San Juan, Puerto Rico as Adm. Nos. 32-63, 14-64, and 28-64.
117 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-140 (1962).
118 39 Stat. 964 (1917), 48 U.S.C. § 821 (1964).
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of the United States and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. The longshoreman's position was that the Yaka
decision had altered this interpretation of the exclusiveness of a Puerto
Rican statute, and uniformity in the application of the maritime law
compelled conformity with the decision. This facet of the case is of
considerable interest, since the view had prevailed under prior circuit decisions that the maritime law of the United States did not apply
in the territorial waters of Puerto Rico. 119 Additionally, it was urged
that the Workmen's Accident Compensation Act of Puerto Rico contams no exception as to the coverage of crew members comparable to
that contained in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, the two acts were not comparable in scope
and the avoidance of "harsh and incongruous results" 120 relied upon
in reaching the decision in Yaka had no application.
The same district court has recently written on this point in
Santiago v. Hermanos. 12 Unlike the Rodriguez case, Santiago was an
in personam action against the vessel owners, inasmuch as the vessel
on which the occurrence took place had sunk so that no lawful seizure
could be made. Although the court decided that the Constitution
made the general maritime law applicable to all of the United States,
it could ascertain no principle which prevented Congress from granting to Puerto Rico the power to legislate as to its own waters. Finding
nothing affirmative which compelled the conclusion that the maritime
laws of the United States were applicable or inapplicable, the court
turned to an examination of the legislation of Puerto Rico. The Puerto
Rican Workmen's Accident Compensation Act was found to contain
an exclusiveness of liability clause as to the employer as well as a
separate section permitting recovery from a third party However,
the court concluded In Santiago that the employer and third party
responsible were one and the same person, and, resorting to Yaka
and the possibility of producing harsh and incongruous results out of
keeping with the legislature's intent to protect workmen, it concluded-that Puerto Rican law was not In conflict with the general
maritime law of the United States and dened the shipowner's motion
to dismiss. It further observed that the vessel owner could be sued
directly in personam or indirectly in rem and in that case the remedies
were alternative. It remains to be seen whether the First Circuit in
119 Fonseca v. Prann, 282 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961); Guemdo v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 234 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1956).
120 373 U.S. at 415.
121255 F Supp. 932 (D. Puerto Rico 1966).
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considering Rodriguez will agree that the compensation act of Puerto
Rico has also succumbed to the influence of Yaka.122
Compounding the confusion resulting from an application of the
Yaka rationale to another compensation act is the interpretation that
courts have consistenfly given the exclusiveness of liability provision
of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. 123 This statute pertains
to government employees, and its vitality has been preserved, despite
assorted efforts of such employees to sue the government for damages
intort as well. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in denying clanns
brought against the government under the Suits inAdmiralty Act 2
in Patterson v. United States125 and the Public Vessels Act 6 in
Johansen v. United States.1 27 In both decisions it was stressed that
if such employees are to be accorded greater rights than those which
they enjoy under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, it is
for Congress and not the federal courts to provide them. More
recently, in United States v. Demko,28 the injured seaman employee
was demed the right to sue the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.129
Moving closer to the Yakla problem isAho v. United States,130 in
which the injured employee brought suit against the government
under the Public Vessels Act' 31and urged Yaka as a basis to avoid the
exclusiveness of liability section of the F.E.C.A. 32 The court stated
that, despite the fact that Yaka had rejected literal application of the
exclusive liability section as to private snpowners under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, tins statutory
provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act would be upheld, thereby relegating such employee solely to his compensation
remedy 1 3 With the inconsistencies as to application of such a provision continuing to increase, the probabilities would seem to favor
an application for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in Aho
122

The First Circuit held that it has not. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Rodnguez, Civil No. 6787,
Ist COr., April 20, 1967, - F.2d - (1967). [Ed.]
12363 Stat. 861 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
12441 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
125 359 U.S. 495 (1959).
12043 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964).
127 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
12887

S.Ct. 382 (1966).

129 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
130 374 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1967).
13143 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964).
13239 Stat. 743 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 757 (1964).
133 374 F.2d at 886.
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or a similar case to resolve another facet of this contradictory area of
the law
That the impact of this Supreme Court pronouncement can be
felt in more remote areas of the law is readily seen in White v. United
States Lnes Co.13 In this instance the doctrine of laches was at issue
and posed a time quandary as to whether old pre-Yaca compensation
clais for injuries occurring on vessels had to be re-examined and
reinvestigated as potential damage suits. White was injured on two
occasions in 1960 and filed admiralty actions against his employer
who was also the vessel owner in December, 1964, a year and seven
months after the Yaka decision. In holding the libelant guilty of
laches, the court observed: that prior to Yaka, section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act meant what it
said; that although it was not until the advent of this decision that a
longshoreman could sue his employer when a shipowner, it likewise
was not until Yaka that an employer has reason to treat White's
injuries except as a compensation case; that different procedures were
followed in handling unseaworthmess cases from routine compensation claims; and that White had given no reasonable notice to his
employer of Is intentions, all of which were prejudicial to the
employer-shipowner.
Another instance which points up how such reasoning precipitates
new applications is seen in Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corp.18 5
which was recently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. 18 In that case the
independent contracting stevedore-employer was sued directly, even
though it had no connection whatsoever with the ownership or operation of the vessel involved which had been dismantled and the
corporation dissolved prior to the institution of suit. It was urged in
that case that the injured longshoreman was a third party beneficiary
of the loading contract between the stevedore and the vessels space
charterer, that the vessel and its owners were no longer available
to be sued and that, if suit were instituted, it would result in mdemnity being imposed on the stevedore employer. Thus, it was argued
that a direct suit against the employer which had no connection or
interest in the vessel was warranted. The Yaka thesis was urged with
vigor, it being contended the economic equality of recovery by a
longshoreman injured under such circumstances justified a direct
suit against the party which would ultimately bear the loss anyway.
F Supp. 480 (D. Md. 1965).
185257 F Supp. 503 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
136 374 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1967).
134 254
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Both the district and circuit courts stressed the importance of the
exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act under these circumstances, inasmuch as
the stevedore which was strictly a shore based independent contractor
owed no warranty of seaworthiness to the injured longshoreman. The
8 and Sanderlin
Fifth Circuit, citing Ferrzgno v. Ocean TransportLtd.13
8
v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., pointed out that a longshoreman was not to be regarded as a third party beneficiary of the stevedore loading contract, a status which the vessel and its owner clearly
occupy under the case law
Watson is potentially of far reaching significance. If by chance
such a suit against an employer when not a shipowner should succeed,
the demise of section 5 of the act as to the exclusiveness of liability
of the employer to its employee would indeed be virtually complete.
If such a result became law, the basic quid pro quo of the compensation act would no longer survive, even in remnant form, and the entire
philosophical base of compromise on which all compensation law
is bottomed would necessarily be undermined and the balance of
interests destroyed.
Conclusion
Whatever the direction and magnitude of the wake of Yakta at
this time, over three years after the Supreme Court's historic pronouncement, it seems reasonably safe to assume that it will increase
substantially in future years. Contrary to many decisions of significance in the law, this holding contains within it two highly flexible
and interrelated ingredients, the direct flouting of the explicit provisions of a congressional statute and the ostensible presence of equitable reasons for doing so. Yet the drastic method employed in Yaka to
cure the legal malaise excises the very bedrock of compromise on
which all compensation acts are based and runs directly counter to
the time tested recognition by the courts that the power to alter,
amend or revise the maritime law rests with the Congress whose will
is paramount. To court and practitioner alike, Yaka is an emgma
which casts an ever lengthening shadow of legal uncertainty and
doubt over the meaning and scope of application of a statute, and,
as the cases suggest, the rationale of this decision has no limit as to
what measures are countenanced to avoid harsh and incongruous
results.
137 309 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1962).
138 261 F Supp. 281 (E.D. Va. 1966).
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In a profession which relies so heavily upon precision m the use
of language m order to avoid a multitude of legal pitfalls, the importance of the decision cannot be minimized. Without definitive guidelines on which maritime practitioners can rely, there is no reason
to assume that other sections of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act as well as other statutes will not be the
subject of further piecemeal judicial amendment. Absent timely action
by the Congress to clarify its intent so that all parties will know their
legal standing before the courts, time alone must gauge the decision's
impact on the law.

